Moreover, both manufacturer 1 and manufacturer 2 achieve their own higher expected profits in NG model followed by SG model. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Proposition 3. Using the analytical results obtained from the above three different decision scenarios, we can easily see that the expressions of the optimal retail prices and maximum expected profits under different decision scenarios. Proposition 4. Determinates of Supplier Power. This indicates that the NG game involving two manufacturers is more beneficial to the whole supply chain than their Stackelberg game; similarly, the NG game involving two manufacturers is more beneficial to each manufacturer than their Stackelberg game. Moreover, other critical supply chain parameters, in particular the various costs that impact the system, are often ill-defined and may vary from time to time [14]. Section 2 gives the problem description and notations. 3. In this paper, we consider the pricing decisions of two complementary products in a fuzzy environment. Marketing Strategy: 2. Consequently, managers in the companies face the problem of establishing a pricing strategy that maximizes the profit over the sales horizon under various situations of price elasticity [2]. [14] studied the pricing problem of substitutable products in a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competitive retailers. 4. [9], we assume that the demand of product 1 from group 1 is expressed as All of these situations raise challenges for using traditional supply chain models in practice [15]. The two manufacturers must make their pricing decisions in order to achieve their own maximal profits, respectively, and behave as if they have perfect information of the demands and the cost structures of other manufacturer. the demand of product 2 from group 3 is given as Sadjadi et al. In the last several years, a considerable amount of research has studied the optimal pricing problem. From Tables 2 and 3, we can have the following results. When the two manufacturers play Stackelberg game and manufacturer 1 is the game leader, manufacturer 1’s optimal retail price (denoted as ) is given as So, the two manufacturers have different market powers, they determine their strategies independently and sequentially. Group 2 buys both products 1 and 2, while group 3 buys product 2 only. 2. As a benchmark to evaluate channel decision in different decision cases, we first develop the pricing model in centralized decision case and derive the optimal retail prices. Clipping is a handy way to collect important slides you want to go back to later.
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